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REVIEW ESSAY

NEPTUNE TRIUMPHUS

Richard Norton

Willmott, H. P. The Last Century of Sea Power. Vol. 1, From
Port Arthur to Chanak, 1892–1922. Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 2009. 543pp. $34.95
Willmott, H. P. The Last Century of Sea Power. Vol. 2, From
Washington to Tokyo, 1922–1945. Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 2010. 679pp. $39.95

Author H. P. Willmott does not lack for self-confidence. This is evident from the
first pages of the provocatively titled The Last Century of Sea Power. In a selfdescribed effort to “explain, rather than describe,” Willmott seeks to shed light
on all aspects of maritime power that have played a role in world affairs during
the last hundred years. This project is of such scope that lesser historians might
well spend their lives in research and never complete a manuscript. Other significant challenges inherent in this task include the need to paint with a fairly broad
brush, without sacrificing critical detail—how to choose which elements to emphasize and how to deal with the personalities that populate the hundred-year
landscape. While the degree to which Willmott has succeeded in this endeavor
may be debated, the resulting work is important enough to find a place on the
bookshelf of any serious student of maritime history.
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security afNot surprisingly, Willmott’s volumes are strucfairs at the U.S. Naval War College. While in the U.S.
tured along primarily chronological lines. Volume 1
Navy, he served at sea, as well as on Capitol Hill as a
Senate liaison officer with the Navy’s Office of Legislabegins with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and
tive Affairs. He retired from the Navy in 1996 with the
eventually arrives at the now all-but-forgotten
rank of commander. He holds a PhD from the Fletcher
Chanak crisis of 1922. These are reasonable points of
School of Law and Diplomacy in international relations. Dr. Norton has edited three national security voldeparture and arrival. The Sino-Japanese War saw,
umes published by the Naval War College.
among other things, one of the first meetings of modern battleships in combat and the emergence of Japan
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as a naval power to be reckoned with. Chanak, as Willmott argues, can be seen as
the end of strictly line-of-sight naval battles, as well as the point where fleets began to be replaced by task groups and task forces. The second volume tells of the
great naval treaties of the 1920s and concludes at the 1945 surrender ceremonies
in Tokyo Bay, with a U.S. Navy unparalleled in power, size, and ability to dominate the world’s oceanic commons.
In the main, this approach works reasonably well. For the most part, Willmott
refuses to allow his primary narrative to become bogged down in the weeds of
description and successfully explains the major maritime muscle movements of
the last century. However, readers who want their history packed with emotion,
heroism, cowardice, and the feelings and acts of individuals are apt to be disappointed. This is not the place to thrill to the sacrifice of Navy commander Ernest
Evans or the triumph of German U-boat ace Gunther Prien, much less to the
tragic farce of U.S. Naval Academy graduate Philo McGiffin. A reader with a
broader panoramic spectrum in mind will not feel the loss, for Willmott provides plenty of information to think about. Like the best histories of any genre,
these books stay with you.
Both volumes are well written and can easily stand alone as significant and independent historical works. Of the two volumes, the first is marginally more
useful, primarily because it illuminates developments and actions that have
gone largely underreported. Willmott’s work on the Dardanelles campaign is especially good, and his carefully built and well supported conclusion that the
Allies were never in a position to gain control of the strait or knock Turkey out of
the war is seemingly impossible to refute.
This is not to imply, however, that the second volume is weak. Its section on
naval disarmament treaties is masterful. Willmott also does a fine job in covering such precursor events to the Second World War as the Ethiopian conflict and
Spanish Civil War, and he offers a superb explanation of the complexities of the
U-boat war in the Atlantic. His discussion of the weakness of Japan’s strategic
planning in the Pacific and its naval deficiencies in general is also convincing,
though his relative lack of regard for Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto may surprise
many readers.
Many elements in these two books deserve to be singled out for praise. One of
the strongest suits of Willmott’s work is his refusal to view naval or military
power as the sole component of sea power. For example, the rise, fall, and crucial
contributions of merchant fleets to national survival and military success are
not ignored. This is especially useful with respect to the critical importance of
Allied merchant shipping to Great Britain’s ability to endure German U-boat
campaigns and eventually emerge on the winning side of two world wars. Another area on which Willmott sheds light is the role of industrial capacity. While
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/10
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the importance of U.S. industrial might to the eventual victory of the United
States in the Pacific is hardly a new discovery, Willmott’s argument that the Japanese navy, built primarily to defeat its U.S. counterpart, succeeded in doing so
but in a way that meant its own destruction by late 1943 is convincing. So too is
his associated observation that in the meantime the United States had built a
much bigger and better fleet that would bring defeat to the shores of Tokyo Bay.
Willmott’s arguments are so strong as to imply that U.S. victory was inevitable
and did not require exceptional strategists, tacticians, or leaders—a conclusion
some will find uncomfortable.
An additional significant strength of this work is extensive documentation.
Willmott provides a staggering array of charts, as well as detailed accounts of armaments, ship sinkings, and building programs. Each chapter contains pages of
supporting data arranged in multiple appendixes. At the same time, Willmott
does not belong to the “cult of statistics.” The documentation merely supports
his explanations and conclusions, and he clearly indicates when data are contradictory or not available.
Another positive element in this Herculean labor is the inclusion of what
could be called the contribution of “lesser naval powers” to the historical tapestry. He does not overlook the ancillary events and the “lesser theaters” of conflict. Willmott examines everything from the roles of the Russian and Turkish
navies in the Black Sea during the First World War to those of the Greek and Yugoslav navies in World War II. This is both important and refreshing, offering a
greater understanding of the historical record.
Willmott does not back away from controversy but rather embraces and even
creates it. Readers will discover there are times, almost always unexpected, when
the author surprises, delights, and quite possibly enrages with his observations
and opinions. On occasion he is surprisingly empathetic and almost lyrical. For
example, Willmott is understandably sympathetic to the plight of Admiral
Pascual Cervera, who commanded Spanish ships in Cuba in 1898, and his description of World War II Free French and Vichy conflicts borders on the poetic.
Indeed, Willmott is at his most human when he anguishes over the sinking of the
Vichy sloop Bougainville by its Free French counterpart Savorgnan de Brazza. He
is equally empathetic when discussing Admiral of the Fleet John Rushworth
Jellicoe’s decision making during the battle of Jutland.
Willmott can also deliver an example with great effect. This can be seen when
he puts the relative contributions of the Soviet Union and the United States into
perspective by noting that in World War II the number of killed Soviet secondlieutenant equivalents exceeded the total combat losses of the United States. The
more one thinks about this fact, the more the actual contribution of the Western
Allies to the land victory in Europe seems to take on a different dimension.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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However, these displays of empathy are rare. Willmott is much more likely to
deliver his opinion as in a drive-by shooting. For example, he claims that the
British systematically and deliberately exaggerated their role in victory over Germany during WWII for years. He also argues that the U-boat war was not won
until 1945, not the more commonly claimed date of 1943. He even has the audacity to suggest that British naval gunnery and damage control left much to be
desired, especially compared to those of U.S. ships—the naval battles of
Guadalcanal notwithstanding. He also attacks the assertion that Admiral
“Jackie” Fisher was the father of the famous Dreadnought class of battleship. His
pen drips with disdain when he describes Winston Churchill as “fraudulently
dishonest” in defending the Dardanelles campaign and “inept” in “terms of the
direction of the overall operation.” One cannot imagine this has endeared
Willmott to much of his British readership.
Willmott also reaches potentially controversial conclusions about several
American admirals who fought in the Pacific. He believes that Admirals Robert
Lee Ghormley and Frank Jack Fletcher were far better than their treatment by
their peers and their subsequent reputations would suggest. Conversely,
Willmott alleges that Admiral Marc Mitscher “deliberately falsified” the battle
report of USS Hornet following the battle of Midway and that both Admirals
Raymond Spruance and Chester Nimitz were aware of it. These assertions stand
out all the more strongly in a work where individuals are rarely discussed.
Readers who finish both volumes will be forgiven if they find themselves eagerly awaiting the third. The changes and events of the second half of the century
provide ample material for Willmott’s discerning eye and razor-sharp tongue. It
is clear that the rise of Soviet maritime power must be an item for discussion, as
will be the emergence of nuclear power and of maritime contributions to nuclear deterrence.
It remains to be seen, though, whether Willmott will be as bold in discussing
failures of leadership in his third volume and whether he is as ready to take issue
with the leaders of the Cold War as he was with their earlier counterparts. Based
on his suggestion that the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq was made with the
same rush and deliberate propagandizing that marked the decision to war with
Spain in 1898, it would appear that he is.
Perhaps the greatest question the third volume will answer is the riddle of the
trilogy’s title. Does Willmott truly believe that the twentieth century was the last
century of sea power, not simply the most recent? John Keagan suggested as
much in his work The Price of Admiralty, only to be proved wrong. It will be most
interesting to see what Willmott has to say on the subject.
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